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Many years have passed since the
terrorist attacks of Sep 11,
2001, and we all know that the
world is different now.
This is especially true for aviation,
since the attacks of that tragic day
were carried out using the mass and
velocity of commercial airliners
with murderous disrespect for the
innocent lives on board and on the
ground.
At this point, many in aviation
believe that the way security is handled
leaves a lot to be desired.
While the courtesy and professionalism
of TSA screeners have
improved tremendously, the long
lines at airport security checkpoints
have not. Every time I stand in a
security line, I wonder whether this
system, where everyone is searched
regardless of threat level assessment,
actually helps to improve
security or is a very inefficient use of
scarce security resources.
Official reactions to perceived
security threats—such as terminal
closings and subsequent rescreenings
of hundreds of passengers,
fighter escorts, or tragedies such as
the shooting of an innocent, mentally
ill passenger at MIA (Intl, Miami
FL) in Dec 2005 by federal air marshals—
are barely noticed any more
by the public and the media.
While there should be no doubt that US
aviation needs to be protected from
the terrorist threat, the question is
whether a security system that
places little trust in the professionals
who actually run aviation every day,
and does not differentiate and focus
in a meaningful way, will ultimately
succeed.
Terrorism is not new to aviation.
The hijacking of a Lufthansa Boeing
737-200 on a flight from PMI
(Palma de Mallorca, Spain) to FRA
(Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany) by
Arab terrorists in Oct 1977 reached
what were at the time new levels of
terrorist brutality and government
response. The crew and more than
100 passengers had to fly several
sectors to various airports in the
Middle East under threat of sudden
death by guns or explosives. On the
third day, on the ground at ADE
(Aden, Yemen), Capt Jürgen Schumann
was forced to kneel down in
the aisle, in front of his passengers,
and was shot and killed. After the
cold-blooded murder of his captain,
First Officer Jürgen Vietor, a former
Navy pilot, had to fly the 737 solo
and finally landed at MGQ (Mogadishu,
Somalia), where an elite
squad of German federal police successfully
raided the plane and killed
the hijackers without hurting a single
passenger.
In many hijackings or bomb threat
situations, flightdeck crews have
worked safely and efficiently to
safeguard their passengers and aircraft.
Passengers trusted their pilots
and crews, and mutual professional
respect had been established
between flightcrews and authorities.
So it was to the surprise of many
pilots that, after Sep 11, they were
suddenly the focus of public attention
and intense security scrutiny,
even though the crews of the 4
doomed flights on Sep 11 had died
heroic—and gruesome—deaths in
the line of duty before their aircraft
were crashed by terrorist intruders
who knew enough to point an aircraft
in the wrong direction.
Professional pilots are generally law-abiding
and patriotic. Many have military
backgrounds. We see ourselves
as partners in aviation security, not
threats. Most of us acknowledge
that airport security has improved,
but it’s hard to distill any overall
concept or great idea from the many
measures taken since Sep 11.
Let me illustrate this with a
freighter trip that I used to fly regularly.
Basically everything happens the
same way every time.
It starts with
check-in at LGA (La Guardia, New
York NY) for a deadhead flight to
BHM (Birmingham AL). Since the
airline we deadhead on is not our
own, and the trips are usually
booked at short notice, one-way, in
first class our bookings evidently
trigger enough flags in the airline’s
reservation system to make the
check-in computer print a code on
our boarding pass. This tells the
screeners that we are randomly
selected individuals who pose an
increased threat to aviation security
and need to be searched thoroughly.
The boarding pass also shows that
we’re airline crew deadheading and
that we’re traveling while on duty.
So we undergo a thorough screening,
wanding and pat-down by TSA
screeners that leaves nothing
unchecked except body cavities.
After this search, half undressed and
barefoot, we are welcomed into first
class with a friendly smile.
The second sector is a different
story. Basically, we get driven in a
van from the arrivals hall around the
airport to the cargo areas and board
our freighter. Then we fly our magnificent
300-ton machine (just the 2
of us, nobody else on board), safely
and professionally, under the stars of
the clear night sky to DTW (Metro,
Detroit MI).
From DTW, we deadhead back to
LGA, but on a different airline, on
which most of us are frequent flyers
and therefore valued customers and
guests. And the frequent flyer number
seems to suppress all the security
flags that were raised by our
booking. After a normal minimal
screening, we board our flight back
to LGA.
Aircrew are trained to use common
sense and reasoning—but so
far I haven’t figured out the security
philosophy behind the 3 different
levels of scrutiny afforded to us on
the 3 sectors of this trip, which all
take place in a single night.
It seems that, for reasons of political
correctness, the threat level of
people passing though airport screening is based not on their identification
or evaluation, but on the
items they carry with them. That this
is not a universally workable
approach becomes clear as soon as
a legitimate law enforcement officer,
such as a federal air marshal, passes
though security with his gun. For
that matter, trained individuals with
bad intent will be able to use as a
weapon many normally innocent
items that can be found on board an
aircraft or in shops and restaurants
in the terminal’s “clean” area.
The paradox of this type of
screening lies in the fact that the
discovery of prohibited items is
largely without consequences for
the people who brought those
items with them.
Items are prohibited
because they are dangerous in
the hands of people with bad
intentions. This is the reasoning
behind all airport screening.
But, once an item is found, it is
just removed and the person may
usually proceed and board. This is
because most people do not seem to
be a threat after all. So, if they are
not a threat, why do we search them
in the first place?
The current system of 100% (blanket)
screening doesn’t seem like an
optimal use of resources. I am sure
that many law enforcement officers
would know better ways to police
our airports—maybe with spot
checks and random searches, not at
specified checkpoints but all over
the terminal.
As far as crewmember
searches go, the captains should be
the ones making the decision as to
whether a search of a specific
crewmember is needed. After all,
the captain has to trust his crew during
the flight, especially in a terrorist
situation.
A captain is ultimately responsible for the
safety and security of his passengers. A
screening system that places little trust in
the professionals who actually run aviation
every day may ultimately not succeed.
The fact that only one person on
board can have final authority
over a vessel and its inhabitants is
engrained deeply in our value system.
Only the people on board a
vessel should control their destiny.
Usually, they let the captain—the
most qualified of them—have that
control.
The captain has the responsibility
for ensuring the safe arrival of his
passengers, crew and freight at their
destination. He/she will try to shield
them as much as he can from all
risks that they may encounter on
their journey. This includes per definition
security risks.
Screeners at ground checkpoints
cannot and should not take over this
responsibility. They may be able to
help with parts of the security problem,
and in doing so help the captain
fulfill his duties, but the allencompassing
responsibility for the
aircraft and its contents can only be
shouldered by the captain himself.
If we accept that the screener
works for the captain, the idea of
him/her checking the captain seems
ludicrous.
Generally, all people on board an
aircraft, as well as those on the
ground, such as government authorities,
operators, family members and
friends, place a high amount of trust
in their pilots. Without that trust, aviation
would look entirely different
and might not be possible at all.
A security search of pilots before
they commence their duties
implies suspicion and lack of trust
on the part of the searching agency.
If the authorities don’t trust
pilots, they shouldn’t let them fly,
even behind bulletproof cockpit
doors. In fact, they shouldn’t issue
licenses to them.
Trust is an indispensable ingredient
of the aviation security equation.
But trust only applies to a person,
not a function. Once trust has been
established, it shouldn’t make a difference
whether a pilot is on duty,
deadheading or going on vacation—
he/she’s still the same person and
deserves the same amount of trust.
Actually, once a person is trusted, it
doesn’t really matter what he/she
carries. One demonstration of this
concept is law enforcement officers
at airports—they are armed, but
trusted.
Judging by the disappointing
results so far of the Federal Flightdeck
Officer Program, powerful
forces are resisting the concept of
trust being applied to professional
aircrew.
When it’s commercially necessary,
the concept of trust goes a long way,
even in aviation. For example, even
in its post-Sep 11 form, the air cargo
industry’s “known shipper” concept
still essentially substitutes trusted
signatures for airport screenings of
all cargo.
Undermining the concept of trust
in pilots is the question of identifica
tion of legitimate pilots at airports.
All of the above may be correct, but
there exists the possibility that
he/she is an impostor. (Think of the
Stephen Spielberg movie Catch Me
If You Can.)
Here’s where technology and
comparisons to law enforcement
go a long way. A universal airport
ID, maybe with modern biometric
data, could help to solve this problem.
Even today, airport police
officers who carry a weapon identify
themselves not only by their
uniform but also with fairly lowtech
ID cards—not unlike your
average professional pilot. Efforts
by the Air Line Pilot Association
(ALPA) to agree on a universal airport
access ID have not been very
successful—probably because
technological and security standards
were set unreasonably high
and airports across the US could
not agree on a uniform standard.
But what’s good enough for law
enforcement should be good
enough for their partners in security—
the pilots. And again, in the air
cargo industry, the documents used
to identify freight from known shippers
are decidedly low-tech.
It would be simple enough for a
professional pilot’s license, such as
an ATP, to be his/her universal airport
access pass. If FAA added pictures
and maybe some other identifying
data to the license, each pilot
would have a federal ID that would
serve to establish identification—
and trust—at airports and facilitate
pilot access to the terminal and
ramp. Only occasional searches
would then be necessary.
Security requires trustworthiness,
identification and responsibility. The
first and foremost question in aviation
security is who to trust. Once
it’s been established who is trustworthy,
the next task is to identify these
persons—after which, responsibility
for security has to be given to these
identified, trustworthy persons.
General and executive aviation
have benefited from this approach to
aviation security in recent years with
healthy growth rates, as customers
recognize and appreciate this more
sensible way to establish security.
At air carrier airports, however,
it’s been difficult to make aircrews
and other airport employees
accept the tighter security screening
system mandated for these airports.
They live with it, but don’t
necessarily accept it as effective or
fully functional.
In a way this is
understandable—some flightcrew
members have been responsible
for aircraft and their occupants for
more then 30 years, while many
workers in the security field are
quite new to aviation.
At airports all around the world,
government and private security
agencies have hired thousands of
screeners. While some of these
screening jobs offer a nice entry into
government careers and attract
responsible professionals, many jobs
in airport security are low-paying
and suffer high turnover rates.
Screeners often have minimal
connection to aviation. Background
checks are difficult due to the high
turnover rates and the international
backgrounds of many employees.
And teaching thousands of people
who are new to aviation how to
access secure areas of airports surely
reduces airport security and
encourages organized crime—or
even terrorism.
At every airport there are experts
who are essential for the functioning
of aviation. Mechanics, controllers,
operations personnel,
flightcrews. A reasonable and efficient
security system will work
with these experts, not against
them.
General and executive aviation
have generally been a good example
in recent years—a watchful eye,
a fence or a gate here, a lock there.
But having an armed guard on a
flight to Washington DC does little
to enhance security. It suggests that
the authorities trust one armed
guard more then the entire
flightcrew—while, in fact, security
can only be successful if the aviation
workers are partners.
When dutifully lining up for an
airport security check a casual
observer might think that Islamic terrorists
had won already, since everyone
removes their shoes—a gesture
of humility once reserved for sacred
places such as mosques.
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